I appreciate well-reasoned comments, both those that liked what I had to say and those who disagree with what I said.

To comments like “According to your premise, in 1961, Mantle woke up one day and decided that he couldn’t handle the pressure anymore and choked away his next 46 PS at bats with 6 hits, 1 double, 1 homer and 1 RBI (the same numbers as Rodriguez)” I applaud yor knowledge of post-season statistics, which I know well way, by the way.

But that is your premise. My premise is not that all poor stats over 46 AB mean that the player is succumbing to pressure. There is more than one reason for a group of statistics.

Mantle was injured in September of 1961, played in only 15 innings of the Yankees last 10 games and played his two games in the 1961 WS with an abscessed hip, with blood soaking through his uniform. In 1962, Mantle once again, limped home down the stretch, and in 1963, when Mantle was 2 for 15, batting .133 with 1 HR and 1 RBI, the entire Yankee team batting .171 for the WS, 22 for 129, with 2 HRs and 4 RBI. The Yanks ran into a hot Koufax, Drysdale, Podres, and Koufax again, and Mantle did about as good as most Yankees, better than most, keeping the Yankees alive in Game 4 with his HR against Koufax.

With ARod, it seemed to be a different story.He seemed healthy and the Yankees were not dominated as they had been in the 1963 WS. As others commented, ARod had very few good swings. He was swinging at pitches outside the strike zone, taking strikes, and popping up and hitting weak grounders on pitches that he normally hammered. Do I absolutely know for sure that ARod was succumbing to he pressure? No of course not. However, it sure looked like he was physically healthy but not getting good swings. It sure looked like the pressure was getting to him.

To comments like, “Yet another ignorant post that still points to Arod was the sole Yankee to blame for the team’s post-season failures from 2004 ALCS Game 4 until 2009″ I can only say, “please read and understand the original post before responding.” I never came close to saying or implying that I thought ARod was the sole Yankee to blame for the Yankees post-season failures.

SJ44 correctly noted that there are different things that sports psychologists do. He noted three: 1) acting as a sounding board so players can vent, 2) having players visualize success, and 3) teaching players relaxation techniques so that they can relax more when that is needed.

These three aspects of sports psychology are some of the most well-known things that sports psychologists do and I suspect all that some sports psychologists do. But for me, these three aspects are a just a tiny drop in the bucket of what sports psychologists do and far from the most successful ways that a sports psychologist can help a baseball player improve his game.

Part of the reason sports psychologists have such widely different approaches is that their backgrounds are widely different, too. Some are therapists that transferred their therapeutic skills and approach to working with athletes and within the field of therapy there are literally over 100 types of therapy so the therapist who go into sports psychology will, by themselves, have over 100 different approaches to what they do.

Besides therapists, physiologists, educators, social psychologists, cognitive psychologists, sports coaches, and athletes themselves have all gone into sports psychology and each of them bring a different set of experiences, skills, and perspectives. And some people have a mixture of backgrounds they bring to sports psychology. I was trained as a cognitive social psychologist (the focus in on people’s thoughts and perceptions – and the person m remembers talking about “re-framing” was using one of the techniques employed by cognitive psychologists) who did his Ph.D research of why people respond differently to pressure situations before the field of sports psychology was established, who also ran a marathon in 2 hours and 37 minutes (6 minutes/mile pace) and played slap ball, punch ball, stickball, baseball, football, and basketball in the streets and playgrounds of New York just about every hour there was day light that I was not in school.

Stuckey is right in that often the job of the sports psychologist is to get athletes to stop thinking when they should be performing. SJ44 is right that sports psychology is not a magic elixir and that some athletes will respond better to one sports psychologist or sports psychology than another sports psychologist or psychology. Bronx born was partially right when he said “You cannot solve a person’s problems for them, you can guide them but not solve it.” My guess is that he thinks sports psychology is “a bunch of bull” because he thinks sports psychologists try to solve a person’s problems, but that is not what the good ones do, as my example about Robinson Cano illustrates. As noted above, he is also wrong that the piece was written “by someone who has never played sports and wishes they did.” That’s such a convenient way of dismissing something you don’t agree with – or in this case even understand – but in this case, it is wrong.

Back to Doreen and Erin. As I tried to illustrate, it is hard to say what sports psychologists do because there are so many completely different approaches. I can give you my approach as a sports psychologist. From my background as an athlete and cognitive psychologist, I see confidence, performing well under pressure, proper focus, getting out of a slump, recovering from setbacks and the like as mental skills that can be taught.

I work with athletes to discover their patterns of thoughts and actions in different settings and circumstances. We look for what works and disrupts the success of that particular athlete because, although there are general principles, what works for one athlete might disrupt the success of another athletes.

I have created literally hundreds of, what I call, mental tools for learning different mental skills because I have found that different athletes respond better to different mental tools. For example, one athlete my improve his confidence by creating a mental “highlight film” of his or her best performances and reviewing that before each game, another may improve his or her confidence more by keeping a “confidence log” of things that they have done above their average in practice and game situations as well as any insights that they have learned that they believe will improve their game, while a third athlete my improve his or her confidence more by imagining that they have just succeeded in their game or event and are answering a reporter’s question on how they were able to put so much effort and focus into their performance. The athlete’s answer to the imaginary reporter’s questions usually reveals what they most believe in about themselves and that is what they can focus on when they need a dose of confidence. Even with the hundreds of mental tools I have developed I use a concept of “adapt before you adopt” by which I mean that each athlete needs to adapt the mental tool to their experience, patterns, personality and goals and only when they do that will they make the mental tool their own and one that work best for them.

For me, sports psychology is not about positive thinking. Thinking “I am the greatest” when I am not, will usually lead only to my not working on things I need to work on to improve. For me, sports psychology is not about discovering some deep-seated issue that started in childhood. For me that is therapy and unnecessary for most athletes who want to improve their game, but the therapists out there will probably disagree with me vehemently, and that is why I prefaced the statement with “for me”.

There are many paths to the same goal. Some paths used by sports psychologists are probably better than others and some better for some athletes than others. I don’t think it is my place to say which types of sports psychology are better than others because I clearly have my biases. And finally, as several people have commented, the mental game is only one aspect in a big picture. When I worked with the Stanford Woman’s basketball team the first year that Tara Vandeveer became their coach, she told me that I was going to have more of a positive affect three or four years down the road because her players needed to develop their physical tools first. She recognized that if you have a great mental game but you don’t have the proper techniques for shooting, rebounding, passing, playing defense, etc, the great mental game won’t take you very far. She was right, too. Four years later Stanford won the NCAA championship.
I don’t think sports psychology is the answer for all situations and probably is never the only answer for any situation. However, I do think a good mental game is part of the pie needed for athletes to perform at their best, and right now, sometimes a pretty big piece of the pie because we have become so good at teaching physical techniques, strength and flexibility training, etc, and are so poor at teaching the mental tools and approaches necessary to best use the techniques and training that we have taught athletes.

The 2004 ALCS was a tale of 2 teams from Games 1-3 and Games 4-7. The Yankees absolutely mashed as a TEAM in Games 1-3, but went cold offensively as a TEAM in Games 4-7. Blaming Arod for the TEAM collapse would show that the accuser either didn’t watch the games (I attended all 4 home games) or just plain hates Arod.

The #s for Games 1-3:
Jeter 2-11 .182
Arod 6-14 .429
Sheffield 9-13 .692
Matsui 9-15 .600
Williams 6-15 .400
Posada 3-10 .300

The #s for Games 4-7:
Jeter 4-19 .210
Arod 2-17 .118
Sheffield 1-17 .059
Matsui 5-19 .263
Williams 5-21 .238
Posada 4-17 .235

No doubt Arod struggled at the plate in Games 4-7, but the same 6 guys who combined for a blistering .449 average in the first 3 games batted a paltry .191 for the last 4 games. I’m as big a Jeter fan as anyone, but he has the fortune of never catching heat for any down performances, including easily having the lowest BA of the group for the series at .200.

The bitter taste in my mouth from that series is how Joe Torre, who always lacked a killer instinct, panicked with a lead in Game 4 by removing Tanyon Strutze, who absolutely owned Boston that year, and bringing in Mo to start the 8th. We all know what happened from there… I was amazed that a reporter after the game had the guts to ask Saint Joe the question that I demanded an answer to: ‘Why did you remove Sturtze?’ Clueless Joe’s answer was ‘He threw 25 pitches.’ I went ballistic over that answer because Sturtze was a STARTER for the first half of that year. His mindset should have been to do all it takes to bury Boston that afternoon. He took his foot off of Boston’s neck and gave them life by making a panicky move that backfired on him. I am usually quite an optimist when watching Yankee games, but I told everyone who would listen at the time that Torre may have blown the series with that one critical move. Unfortunately, my fears proved to be well-founded.

I digressed a bit with the Torre rant (thank God we have Girardi), but my point is that the Yankee post-season failures during that period were as a TEAM, a concept that few fans and media get. No player had as glaring and negative spotlight shined upon him during this time while other name players on the same teams struggled mightily and had their performances ignored. In baseball, TEAMS win and TEAMS lose. It’s not about one player’s performance. It’s the team’s responsibility to pick up a player who is slumping and to overcome any stumbling blocks in the lineup.

The negative treatment of Arod during that period actually made me embarrassed to be a Yankee fan. Let Boston boo Arod or their own players. I will never boo someone wearing the pinstripes, as I want our players to be comfortable in their own Stadium. Heck, I even cheered for Carl Pavano when he was on the mound, even though I disliked him personally.

A final note for those who point to Arod for the championship ‘drought’ – The Yankees won zero titles with Mike Mussina, Don Mattingly as a player or coach, Gary Sheffield, Jason Giambi, Randy Johnson, Jeff Weaver, Kevin Brown, Jaret Wright, Shawn Chacon, Kyle Farnsworth, Cory Lidle, Sidney Ponson, Bobby Abreu, Doug Mientkiewicz, Wilson Betemit, Carl Pavano, Luis Vizcaino, Ivan Rodriguez, or any other higher-priced players who came to the team either by trade or FA signing. Forget about how much a player makes (not Arod’s fault that teams are willing to pay him dearly). The collective result on the field is all that matters. That’s why baseball is considered a TEAM sport.

“I appreciate your comments. I knew Tiger as a young kid and even at 15 he had a sports psychologist. Regardless iof his present problems he had to deal with a huge amount of pressure as a young guy.

My question to Jeff is … Robbie Cano obviously (at least to me) needs help to learn how to handle the additional pressure (which I think is mostly self imposed) when he bats with men on base.

From what you see, read and hear is Cano the type of person that can use the skills a sports psychologist can teach him?”

Glad you appreciated the comments.

Robinson Cano, who hit just .207 w/RISP in 2009, certainly didn’t seem comfortable at the plate in those situations – and I saw most of the games. He also hit just .210 w/RISP in 2005, his rookie year. But, in between Robbie’s numbers w/RISP were OK. His other BAs w/RISP: .306 in 2006, .290 in 2007 and .263 in 2008 (the year he hit .271). Robbie’s numbers and pattern suggest to me that his .207 BA w/RISP in 2009 was partially due to what he was doing differently with RISP and partially due to bad luck. In 2010, I’d expect him to hit closer to his career .256 BA w/RISP (794 AB) if he made no changes. However, Robbie is a career .331 hitter with the bases empty (1503 AB), so I suspect something is going on.

If I were working with Robinson Cano I’d ask him to recall specific ABs with the bases empty and to tell me his approach going into the AB, as well what he was doing before and after each pitch. After “looking” at perhaps a dozen ABs with the bases empty, half of which he had good swings and half of which he didn’t have good swings, I’d ask him to do the same things for 12 ABs w/RISP.

I have found that professional athletes have amazing recall of their performances and I suspect that Cano would have no trouble picking out ABs in which he remembered what he was thinking and doing, but if he had no difficulties remembering them, he could get the footage of his ABs and watching the ABs would probably be enough to help him remember his approach and what he was thinking and doing.

What we would be looking for is anything that Robbie is doing/thinking differently w/RISP from what he is doing/thinking with the bases empty. In my experience working with baseball players – and other athletes as well as sales people, musicians, engineers, and other people in widely different endeavors – usually something pops out pretty quickly in terms of what they are doing or thinking differently in pressure and non-pressure situations, at least if they are having difficulties performing as well in pressure situations.

People are usually surprised at what they discover. Much of my job as a sports psychologist is helping them look in the right direction. Once Cano discovers what he is doing or thinking differently in pressure and non-pressure situations, we’d examine if he’d be better off taking the same approach in pressure situations as he’s taking in non-pressure situations.

You might be surprised that some people still think they should be doing/thinking what they are doing/thinking in pressure situations even when they clearly can see that they are doing poorly in pressure situations, but their view of what they are supposed to do (e.g, try harder or tell themselves to relax) is so strong that they have difficulty letting go of it even in the face of evidence that their approach is not working. In order for Cano (or anyone else)to change, they have to “own” the change – think it is the right way to go – or they will simply go back to what what they were doing. Good sports psychologists rarely try to convince their client of anything but instead looks to find different ways to have their clients discover what works best for them.

Even this example is simplified, but I hope my example gives you a better idea how a sports psychologist might work with Robinson Cano.

btw, my educated guess – but it is just a guess without talking to Cano – is that Robbie is being too passive or focusing too much on just making contact w/RISP. For his career Cano gets singles in 21% of his ABs with the bases empty and 16.9% of his ABs w/RISP, giving him 24% more singles/AB with the bases empty. But his extra base hits (EBH) with the bases empty vs w/RISP are much more striking. Cano has 40% more EBH/AB with the bases empty than he does w/RISP. Cano hits a HR every 27.8 ABs with the bases empty but only everty 41.8 ABs w/RISP and hits a double every 12.4 ABs with the bases empty but only every 18.9 ABs w/RISP.

My guess is that Cano’s success strategy with the bases empty is something simple like, “see the ball, drive the ball” but that w/RISP he’s making it more complicated than it needs to be for him, perhaps telling himself to get a hit or to just go for a single to get the runner in, or ironically given almost everyone’s complaint about Cano, to be more patient. We know what Cano does and thinks with the bases empty works for him – for his career, he is hitting .331/.363/.528 with the bases empty, sporting an .892 OPS, more than 200 points better than his .689 OPS w/RISP – so what Cano needs to do w/RISP is to use the same success strategy that he uses with the bases empty.

If my guesses proved accurate, we could then speculate why Cano developed two different approaches or why he developed his unsuccessful approach w/RISP, but all that speculation, while perhaps fascinating, is totally unnecessary for helping Cano discover what changes he needs to make to improve his hitting w/RISP.

In fairness to Mussina, who it is now fashionable to discredit, that was a kangeroo court of a strike zone. A pitcher like Mussina just has to get certain calls to succeed. Especially when they are clearly strikes!